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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the effect of relative/absolute firm efficiency on weighted aver-
age cost of capital (WACC). Using a sample of Korean listed firms, we find that WACC 
is negatively associated with relative firm efficiency (operational performance) suggesting 
that firms with higher (lower) relatively efficiency are expected to pay lower (higher) capi-
tal costs. When we repeat our analysis using absolute firm efficiency (ROA), we do not find 
a statistically significant relationship. Our results suggest relative efficiency which is esti-
mated as output (sales) divided by the resources that are directly under the control of man-
agement is assessed by capital providers and impounded into a firm’s capital costs. Abso-
lute efficiency (ROA) which is estimated as sales divided by total assets is not. Our results 
suggest that simple accounting ratios used in the accounting literature are not considered as 
informative to explain borrowing costs compared to relative efficiency that captures mana-
gerial operational performance.
Keywords Firm efficiency · DEA · Cost of capital · WACC  · Risk
JEL Classification A1 · G1 · G3 · M1 · M4
1 Introduction
The efficiency-risk hypothesis implies efficient firms have a higher concentration of debt 
in their capital structure, suggesting that inefficient firms face financing limitations based 
on perceived risk (Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010). However, the efficiency measurements 
employed by capital providers to measure risk is not well-established in the literature. 
Efficiency studies are divided into two methodological approaches (1) absolute efficiency 
(AFE) and (2) relative efficiency (RFE). AFE is estimated using variations of simple 
accounting ratios, such as sales (output) divided by assets and/or capital (input). RFE is a 
more sophisticated technique that is estimated using two techniques: (1) Data Envelopment 
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Analysis (DEA) using linear programming, and (2) econometric techniques such as Sto-
chastic Frontier Analysis. Increasingly, studies report that RFE is inherently more informa-
tive compared to simple accounting ratios because it has the potential to capture manage-
rial performance (Combs et al., 2005; Crook et al., 2008; Demerjian et al., 2012a, 2012b; 
Frijns et al., 2012). Recent studies use DEA to develop RFE models that measure opera-
tional efficiency (Demerjian et al., 2012a, 2012b; Lim & Mali, 2018a, 2018b). Operational 
RFE measures capture efficiency as relative sales generated (output) from resources/costs 
under the direct control of management (input). Based on the extant literature, RFE can 
be considered a superior estimation model compared to AFE. However, from a real-world 
application standpoint, whether firm stakeholders and market participants interpret that 
both types of efficiency are equal is a question left unanswered.
There is evidence that rating agencies provide higher credit ratings to firms with higher 
relative efficiency, implying RFE is a specific form of information that can be used as an 
indicator of whether a firm is likely to survive a business cycle (Lim & Mali, 2019). Mali and 
Lim (2021) demonstrate that audit clients (firms) are incentivised to signal operational per-
formance (RFE) is genuine by securing increasing audit effort. The results indicate that client 
firms believe that there are economic benefits to signalling robust performance to market par-
ticipants based on RFE. Thus, in this study, we are motivated to establish whether previously 
unknown economic benefits associated with RFE can be ascertained by firms, and empiri-
cally demonstrated. We are also motivated to illustrate whether capital providers differentiate 
between more sophisticated RFE techniques and simple AFE techniques, hence adjust bor-
rowing costs accordingly based on the perceived information quality of both measurements.
Using OLS regression, we find a negative relation between WACC and RFE. The results 
demonstrate that firms with higher RFE are required to pay lower capital costs compared 
to less efficient firms. We interpret that the ability of a firm to generate sales based on 
resources that are directly under the control of management are considered by capital pro-
viders as a robust measurement of operational performance (risk); thus, WACC is reduced. 
Next, we test whether RFE and AFE are considered equal by capital providers. We find a 
statistically insignificant relation between WACC and ROA (AFE measure). When we add 
both AFE and RFE into regressions, RFE is still statistically significant with WACC, AFE 
remains statistically insignificant. The results suggest that RFE has an incremental effect 
on WACC, but AFE does not. Our results are consistent to various forms of additional 
analyses including the division of WACC into its two individual components; Cost of Debt 
(COD) and Cost of Equity (COE), ’risk criteria’, persistency tests, stochastic frontier analy-
sis and Fama and MacBeth (1973) year, industry regressions and endogeneity tests.
Our study is important for several reasons. First, Yatsenko and Hritonenko (2016) report 
that there is a connection between the production process and capital costs. We extend this 
argument by clearly demonstrating that after controlling for known firm risk determinants, 
higher levels of RFE reduces WACC. We interpret that capital providers have the sophis-
tication to monitor operational performance and impound the associated risk into WACC. 
Securing inexpensive WACC is the most important function of a firm’s finance depart-
ment. Thus, we expand the literature by demonstrating a specific example where robust 
tactical management has an explicit organizational advantage. Second, the productivity lit-
erature identifies two forms of efficiency, AFE and RFE. However, specific examples of the 
relative informativeness of both efficiency measures are rarely captured empirically. The 
extant literature acknowledges that RFE is considered more informative compared to AFE 
based on its various computational advantages (Demerjian et al., 2012a, 2012b; Leverty & 
Grace, 2012; Barr & Siems, 1997; Andersen & Petersen, 1993; Cook & Zhu, 2006). Our 
results demonstrate a specific example where RFE is considered incrementally informative 
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by capital providers, but AFE is not. To the best of our knowledge, we are the very first to 
capture a different relationship between RFE and AFE with any dependent variable based 
on performance/risk. To avoid repetition, we provide a detailed explanation of the numer-
ous reasons why RFE can be considered a more informative efficiency measure by capital 
providers in the hypothesis development (H.2.) and conclusion Sect. 6).
Finally, there are conflicting views in the productivity literature about the usefulness of 
absolute accounting numbers as a measure of firm performance. Proponents consider AFE 
to be the most important measure of success (Rangone, 1997), with critics suggesting that 
AFE is uninformative (Chamber, 1960; Athanassopoulos & Thanassoulis, 1995). In our 
study, we show AFE is not as informative to capital provides, suggesting that firm opera-
tional performance (RFE) is a more important measure of risk compared to ratios that sig-
nal accounting profit (AFE). Because both efficiency measures can be considered different 
by market participants, we would encourage future studies to include both RFE and AFE 
measures into regressions to enhance the predictive validity of empirical models.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review 
literature and investment theories relevant to our hypotheses. In Sect.  3, we explain our 
research design, and provide information about model design. In Sect. 4, we analyse empir-
ical results. In Sect. 5, we explain our additional analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2  Literature review and hypothesis
2.1  Literature review
McWilliams and Smart (1993) suggest that more efficient firms have a comparative advan-
tage relative to inefficient industry peers. Consistent with the efficient structure hypothesis, 
Demsetz (1973) surmises that firms with the ability to make robust decisions to optimize 
efficiency will earn higher profits, increase market share and become larger. Efficiency 
ratios capture the resource management effectiveness of firms, with higher efficiency dem-
onstrating effective strategic management (Neely et al., 1995). Management can improve 
efficiency by implementing two different strategies: Firstly, sales maximization (output). 
Management that are able increase sales demonstrate an ability to understand; the needs of 
their customers; market trends; and technological developments. Secondly, firms that opti-
mize resource expenditure (input) without reducing sales can also be considered efficient. 
Efficient firms utilize available resources to optimize sales including production, adver-
tising, marketing, staff and capital expenditure. However, given management can employ 
different strategies to optimize efficiency, there is an increasing impetus in the literature to 
define efficiency as an organizational construct.
The productivity literature divides firm efficiency into two methodological approaches, 
AFE and RFE. AFE calculates a firm’s efficiency as the ratio of output divided by inputs. 
Examples of absolute accounting ratios include the value of total earnings divided by total 
assets (ROA) or equity (ROE) and ATO (asset turnover ratio) amongst others. In empirical 
studies, ROA is the most commonly used AFE measure because it is simple to estimate and 
easily interpreted. Countless studies capture a positive relation between AFE and numer-
ous forms of organizational performance (Abarbanell & Bushee, 1997; Lev & Thiagara-
jan, 1993; Ou & Penman, 1989; Soliman, 2008). Whilst AFE is simple to calculate and 
interpret, there is a vast literature suggesting that RFE is a more robust measure of firm 
efficiency compared to AFE (Callen, 1991; Demerjian et  al., 2012a, 2018; Frijns et  al., 
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2012). Critics argue AFE is an inferior measure compared to frontier analysis because (1) 
AFE can be influenced using accounting treatments and policies that reduce the levels of 
assets (denominator) relative to sales (numerator), (2) all values are considered as equiva-
lent inputs to generate sales when some inputs will yield higher sales, and (3) absolute 
measures such as ROA are considered equivalent market/industry measures when the profit 
margins are almost certainly different in different industries (Combs et  al., 2005; Crook 
et al., 2008; Demerjian et al., 2012a, 2018).
Because AFE can be considered a less robust measurement of efficiency compared 
to RFE, increasingly, studies have adopted RFE to add robustness to empirical models. 
Numerous studies use frontier analyses to capture firm effectiveness (Bergendahl, 1998; 
Berenguer et  al., 2016; Bendoly, et  al., 2009; Ross & Droge, 2002; Thompson et  al., 
1996; Sherman & Zhu, 2006; Sun, 2004). Moreover, studies demonstrate a positive rela-
tion between relative efficiency and various forms of organizational performance (Alam & 
Sickles, 1998; Cummins et al., 2010; Greene & Segal, 2004). Lim and Mali (2018a, 2018b) 
show RFE influences the propensity of market participants to invest/disinvest. Mali and 
Lim (2019) demonstrate that firms with higher RFE are likely to achieve higher credit rat-
ings. A study by Baik et al. (2013) shows that after controlling for absolute efficiency, rela-
tive efficiency has a positive and statistically significant relation with profitability changes 
without the existence of a collinearity problem. The findings show that both RFE and AFE 
can represent different forms of efficiency. Baik’s (2013) study raises important questions 
whether RFE and AFE are considered equally by market participants or whether they dif-
ferentiate between both types of efficiency.
Whilst Tsolas (2015) suggests that there is no association between operational perfor-
mance and firm risk, in this study, we consider capital providers are likely to consider firm 
performance based on both RFE and AFE. Both debt and equity providers issue capital 
cost terms to firms based on performance/risk. Therefore, they have a high incentive to 
monitor clients to optimize capital investment. To estimate whether capital providers con-
sider efficiency performance when providing capital, we utilize WACC. WACC is the aver-
age rate a firm is expected to pay to secure capital indicating the minimum return that a 
company needs to earn on an existing asset base to satisfy its shareholders, creditors, and 
other capital providers. WACC is subdivided into two measures; the cost of debt (COD), 
and the cost of equity (COE) calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
COD is calculated as the aggregated value of interest demanded from a bank, bondhold-
ers and other forms of debt financing institutions. The two main forms of debt available 
for firms are private debt markets (banks) and public debt markets (bondholders). Banks 
and credit rating agencies offer more favourable credit terms based on a robust analysis of 
firm level risk (Francis et al., 2005; Bharath, 2008). Evidence suggests that despite high 
profile financial crises, banks and credit rating agencies are effective monitors of firm level 
risk, and banks are effective monitors for the debt market (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Based on 
the literature, debt providers are likely to conduct a robust analysis of firm fundamentals 
including RFE, thus have the potential to include RFE inferences into COD.
COE is estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. CAPM has been developed to 
explain the positive linear relationship between risk and market returns (Markowitz, 1952; 
Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Black & Scholes, 1973). To improve the predictive validity 
of the model, Fama and French (1992) add variables known to influence risk, size and 
market-to-book ratio. Carhart (1997) enhance the model by considering the momentum 
factor for stocks. Fama and French (2016) develop the model again by including profit-
ability and investment proxies. Critics of CAPM suggest it is not a complete model (Pastor 
and Stambaugh, 2003; Easley et al., 2002). Fama and French (2004) suggest the model is 
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miss-specified because beta does not differentiate in the direction of stock movements; and 
French (2016) criticize that CAPM risk estimates are time constant. However, despite the 
criticisms of CAPM, the model is accepted by analysts and investors as a measure of the 
returns that income maximising investors would require for bearing additional risk (Greg-
ory et al., 2018). Therefore, based on the efficient market hypothesis, investors are risk sen-
sitive and are likely to conduct a robust analysis of firm fundamentals when issuing capital. 
As with CAPM, whilst there is evidence that WACC has limitations (Barth et al., 2013), 
WACC is used on a daily basis in international markets to measure risk. Thus, there is a 
strong potential that firm characteristics such as RFE and potentially AFE are impounded 
into this WACC.
2.2  Hypotheses
Previous studies suggest that market participants are motivated to interpret operational perfor-
mance (RFE) (Lim & Mali, 2018a, 2018b; Mali & Lim, 2019), with RFE reducing firm level 
uncertainty and having a positive effect on credit ratings. As a result, there is also the potential 
that capital equity and debt providers consider RFE when issuing capital. Whilst high levels of 
efficiency are important for firms, a firm’s primary function in financing is to reduce capital 
costs. Therefore, capturing whether firms can achieve the double comparative advantage of 
lower WACC and higher RFE is an important discovery for firms, as well as the literature.
Firms can maximize efficiency using two different strategies. (1) a firm can increase 
sales to maximize efficiency (output maximization), implying experienced managers have 
developed strategies to increase output (sales), for example; effective advertising; mar-
keting campaigns; competitive pricing strategies; and an ability to keep up to date with 
technological developments and industry trends, relative to peers. (2) A firm can reduce 
expenditure to increase their efficiency (input minimization) by optimizing resources. Such 
firms are likely to have the ability to; keep their staff motivated without incurring unneces-
sary expenses; optimize their production processes and; are unlikely to waste resources on 
inefficient projects that do not generate sales. Because RFE is a relative measurement of 
the effectiveness of the above strategies, we would expect to find a negative relationship 
between RFE and WACC based on capital providers impounding RFE information into 
WACC as a form of firm risk, after controlling for other known measures of risk. Thus, we 
develop the following hypothesis:
H1 Relative efficiency levels reduce a firm’s WACC 
In our second hypothesis, we test whether RFE is a more informative measurement of 
investment risk compared to AFE. There is the potential that RFE and AFE can have different 
effects on WACC based on the analysis of capital providers. Based on the following method-
ology advantages, we consider that capital providers may impound RFE into WACC, but not 
AFE for the following reasons, (1) whilst American evidence suggests that ROE has a nega-
tive relation with capital costs (Safdar, 2018), AFE as a measure is subject to a mathematical 
limitation. It is likely that accounting treatments and financial decisions can influence values 
such as ROE and ROA. For example, an increased dividend improves the ROE ratio, and land 
revaluation or patent depreciation enhances ROA performance. Thus, AFE performance ratios 
subject to accounting treatments can be considered as an inferior measure to RFE, which is 
not subject to the same level of variation as a result of accounting treatments or modifications. 
(2) Our RFE measure which captures operational performance is estimated only using (inputs) 
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resources and costs that are directly under the control of management (PPE + Operating 
Lease + Goodwill + Other Intangibles/Cost of goods sold + SG&A). On the other hand, AFE 
estimates efficiency using values recorded on annual reports such as land, cash and equiva-
lents (shares) that are not used by managers to generate sales.
(3) RFE is calculated using frontier analysis (Data Envelopment Analysis) to discover the 
optimum efficiency of a firm within an industry known as a decision-making unit (DMU). 
Therefore, whilst ROA considers all inputs to be equal, the most effective utilization of $1 
resource to maximize sales can be captured using RFE (Demerjian et al., 2012a, 2012b; Jacobs 
et al., 2016). All firms within a specific industry must decide on the most effective utilization 
of resources to maximize sales. RFE shows the optimum ratio of cost of goods sold, PPE and 
all other inputs for a manufacturing firm and identifies the most efficient firm resource utiliza-
tion from all available inputs. AFE considers all inputs as equal. (4) RFE develops a maxi-
mum efficiency vector for all firms within an industry. However, through scaling, RFE avoids 
the benchmarking problem that exists in traditional methods (Barr & Siems, 1997; Leverty & 
Grace, 2012). Efficiency values of service firms will be inherently different to manufacturing/
merchandising firms. Thus, a like for like AFE ratio can be considered as having inherent 
industry bias because of the higher margins in some industries. RFE incorporates a weighting 
structure that provides a relative measure of efficiency for all firms ranging from 0 to 1. (5) 
Previous studies suggest that increased transparency can reduce information asymmetry and 
lower WACC (Baik et al., 2013; Barth et al., 2013). AFE considers firms with equal absolute 
values to have identical performance. However, virtually all possible combinations of inputs 
for each DMU can be considered using RFE. Therefore, RFE has the potential to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry because it is a significantly more informative measure of managerial deci-
sion making compared to AFE. Based on the above, we develop the following hypothesis:
H2 Relative efficiency has a different effect on WACC compared to accounting book value 
efficiency.
3  Research design
3.1  Variable definition
3.1.1  WACC 
We calculate weighted average cost of capital (WACC) in Eq. (1). WACC is the ’weighted’ 
combination of cost of debt (COD) in Eq. (2) and cost of equity (COE) in Eq. (3). To estimate 
WACC, we multiply both values; COE and COD with the weightings in Eq. (4) and (5) to 
aggregate our values consistent with market values recognized on the Korean Stock Exchange 
and previous Korean literature. We provide details of how WACC is calculated below:
(1)WACC = Cost of debt ∗ Weight1 + Cost of equity ∗ Weight2
(2)
Cost of debt = (Interest expenses + Bond interest + Loss on bond retirement
−Gain on bond retirement + interest on the construction capital)
∕(Short term bond + Short term borrowing + Current maturities of long
− term debt − Other current maturities of long − term debt + Long − term bond
+Financial lease liabilities + Asset backed debt + Liabilities without preference)
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where Rf  the average interest rate for a 3-year treasury bond (the risk-free rate of interest), 
i market beta, calculated using the Equally Weighted Index (EWI), MPi market premium; 
we use 3.3%, following the Korea Stock Exchange report, a value used in previous Korean 
studies.
The COD weighting is the average IBDC (interest-bearing debts for cost) divided by 
IBDC plus AMC (average annual market capitalization of common and preferred stock) in 
Eq. (4). The weighting for COE is AMC divided by IBDC and AMC in Eq. (5). For clarity, 
we list the below weighting:
3.2  Relative efficiency
Next, we estimate relative efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). To calcu-
late relative efficiency, we borrow from Mali and Lim’s (2018) modified Demerjian et al. 
(2012a, 2012b) managerial ability (relative efficiency) model which is explicitly designed 
to capture operational performance using the following procedure. First, we construct a 
strongly balanced panel by firm and year from 2000 to 2015. Second, we sort firms by year 
and industry. Third, we classify each firm as an individual decision-making unit (DMU). 
Each firm listed on the Korean Stock Exchange is considered a DMU. Each DMU is 
divided by industry to estimate efficiency by industry. We estimate RFE for each individual 
DMU using Eq. (6). In Eq. (6), the numerator is gross sales (output), consistent with prior 
research (Verma, 1993). Fourth, we estimate our denominator, the resoues that are directly 
under the control of a manager (input). Input is divided into ’given resources’ and ’costs’. 
Given resources are equity items listed on a firm’s financial statements that are under the 
control of managers (PPE + Operating Lease + Goodwill + Other Intangibles). Costs are 
classed as expenses a manager can utilize to generate sales. Costs include R&D, advertis-
ing expenses, admin expenses and cost of goods sold (Cost of goods sold + SG&A).
where Sales: (Output) Gross Sales, Given Resources: PPE + Operating Lease + Good-
will + Other Intangibles, Costs: Cost of goods sold + SG&A, PPE: net property, plant, and 
equipment, Operating lease: net operating lease, Goodwill: purchased goodwill.
Fifth, to estimate DEA, we discover the most efficient firm in each industry by opti-
mizing the efficiency of each firm. This value captures an aggregate of the most efficient 
expenditure of each given resource and cost per unit of sales. Based on DEA estimations, a 
value can be estimated for the most efficient utilization aggregate for each firm (efficiency 
frontier horizon) in each industry. In Eq. (7), sales are represented by s and given resources 
and costs are represented by m for all DMUs. This is necessary to demonstrate that differ-
ent industries are required to utilize different combinations of inputs to achieve outputs. 
We also add weightings for our input and output levels. The weightings for our input and 
output values are denoted by u and v. The weighting determines the efficiency frontier by 
(3)Cost of equity (CAPM) = Rf + i ∗ MPi
(4)Weight1 = IBDC∕(IBDC + AMC)
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varying the weights of u and v and enables a sample and market comparison. After per-
forming Eq. (7) for each firm in each industry, a specific DEA vector for that industry is 
established.
Finally, we use the industry measures to estimate the efficiency of each firm within a 
specific industry compared to the market. Thus, the derived optimal weights (DEA vec-
tor) are multiplied by the corresponding output and input quantities for scaling purposes 
to yield a ratio-based efficiency score for each DMU. An ordinal value of 1 is given to the 
firm with the optimal efficiency on the efficiency frontier. A scaled value for the optimally 
efficient firm has the potential to be represented 5.5/5.5 (1 scaled). By comparison a scaled 
less efficient firm has the potential to be represented as 2/5.5 (0.3815 scaled). The scal-
ing procedure allows all firms within an industry to be compared with the market using 
an ordinal rank. The scaling process allows us to compare how efficiency is achieved in 
specific industries and in the entire sample of listed firms. Our given resources and costs in 
Eq. (6) are estimated as x in Eq. (7). Sales in Eq. (6) are represented by y in Eq. (7).
The classical Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model by Charnes et  al. (1978) 
assumes constant returns to scale. Conversely, the BBC (Banker et al., 1984) model pre-
sents a concave downward efficiency frontier that presumes variable returns to scale. As a 
benchmark, we assume constant return to scale based on Afzal and Lawrey (2012). Also 
based on the mechanical relationship between output (sales) and input (costs and operat-
ing assets), we believe our DEA model is a robust and felicitous model to report returns-
to-scale. In our additional analysis section, we conduct an isotonic regression analysis 
(see Sect. 5.7) suggesting that there is a strong positive association between output (sales) 
and each component of input (costs and given resources), providing evidence of constant 
returns to scale. However, we infer that firms that have increasing returns to scale com-
pared to industry peers are relatively efficient firms, as output increases to a greater extent 
compared to industry peers (increasing returns to scale). On the contrary, we consider firms 
that have decreasing returns to scale compared to industry peers, as relatively inefficient 
firms (decreasing returns to scale).
The DEA variable illustrated in Eq.  (7) is listed as our dependent variable 
1Relative_Effii,t in Eq. (8). In Eq. (8), we perform OLS regression to determine whether 
our ordinal estimation of relative efficiency using DEA has a negative influence on a firm’s 
WACC. Based on our first hypothesis, we would expect managers that make effective oper-
ational decisions to maximize output from given resources to secure lower capital costs. 
This relation would be modelled as a negative relation between relative efficiency and 
WACC in Eq. (8).
Absolute efficiency is our second variable of interest. As explained in our literature 
review, various studies use simple accounting ratios to proxy for absolute efficiency. Abso-
lute efficiency is calculated as overall firm efficiency, computed by dividing EBITDA /
prior year total assets. There is the potential that the relation between absolute performance 








k = 1,… , n.
(8)
WACCi,t = 0 + 1Relative_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t + 3Sizei,t
+ 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t + 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t + 8Credit_Riski,t
+ 9Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t
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efficiency with lower borrowing costs. If the result is insignificant, absolute efficiency does 
not provide capital providers with information about investment risk, and has no effect on 
WACC.
We include important control variables to enhance the explanatory power of our model. 
The definition for each variable is included in Table 1. The first control variable is Mar-
ket_Risk, defined as market beta. Beta is the systematic risk of a security in comparison to 
the market as a whole. Whilst beta is used in estimating COE in CAPM, we also include 
beta as an important control variable to control for market risk because beta represents 
the return an investor would expect for bearing additional risk. Therefore, a higher beta 
is expected to be significantly positively associated with our dependent variable WACC, 
because higher market risk naturally increases cost of capital. For robustness, in our addi-
tional analysis, we exclude beta and repeat our analysis using stock price volatility as a dif-
ferent market risk proxy. Size is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Larger 
firms are likely to have more resources and lower levels of downside risk; as a result, they 
are likely to pay lower capital costs. Leverage is calculated as total assets divided by total 
liabilities. Leverage is expected to have a negative relation with WACC because firms with 
lower assets relative to debt are risker. Cash performance is proxied by CFO, calculated 
as cashflow from operations divided by total assets. We expect firms with superior cash 
performance to have lower borrowing rates compared to firms with inferior cash perfor-
mance. Earnings management, a form of managerial opportunism is estimated as the abso-
lute value of discretionary accruals suggested by Dechow et al. (1995). We expect firms 
that engage in earning management should have higher capital costs.
Next, we control for ownership structures using the percentage ownership of the larg-
est shareholder. There is conflicting evidence whether concentrated ownership has a 
negative, (see Dann & DeAngelo, 1983; Bhojraj Sengupta, 2003; Tran, 2014) or posi-
tive (Datta et al., 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) relation based on large shareholders 
having the power to expropriate wealth / demanding the implementation of robust gov-
ernance systems. However, based on Lim and Mali’s (2018a, 2018b) Korean evidence, 
Table 1  Variable definitions
Dependent variable Sign Definition
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Variables of interest
 Relative efficiency – Technical efficiency score computed using data envelopment analysis
 Absolute efficiency – Overall efficiency computed by dividing EBITDA / prior year total assets
Control variables
 Market risk  + Beta, systematic risk of a security in comparison to the market as a whole
 Size – Natural logarithm of total assets
 Leverage  + Debt ratio (= total liabilities / total assets)
 Cash Performance – CFO (= Cash flow from operation / total assets)
 EM(Earnings Mgt)  + Absolute value of discretionary accruals suggested by Dechow et al.(1995)
 Bigown – Governance structure, Biggest shareholder’s share holdings (%)
 Credit risk – Credit rating scores ranging from 1 to 10
 Audit quality – Audit hours
 ID ? Industry fixed effect
 YD ? Year fixed effect
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increasing ownership power enhances monitoring. Thus increasing ownership can be 
expected to reduce WACC. We provide an ordinal rank for a firm’s credit rating from 1 
(D) to 10 (AAA) based on the assumption that WACC is decreasing with credit risk. We 
expect to find a negative association between WACC and credit ratings because a credit 
rating is designed to capture default risk. Audit hours are shown to be positively associ-
ated with relative efficiency (Mali & Lim, 2020). Therefore, we would expect a negative 
relation between WACC and audit hours based on audit demand theory. All variables 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to control for the effect of outliers.
3.3  Sample
In Table 2, we provide information about our sample selection process. We download 
all firm financial data for Korean listed firms, listed on the Korean Stock Exchange 
(KRX) from KIS-value and TS-2000 databases. After excluding financial firms, we have 
a potential sample of 14,745 firm year observations. We then discard 3913 observations 
with insufficient financial data to conduct necessary analyses, leaving a final sample of 
10,823. The mean level of our sample’s weighted cost of capital and relative efficiency 
is estimated every year in Panel B. From 2000 to 2015, we show the results of 921 
firm observations. In the year 2000, the sample’s mean WACC is 8.77 and the sample’s 
mean relative efficiency is 0.53. From 2001 to 2015 the overall trend shows that mean 
WACC has been decreasing by 71% to 5.12. The sample’s mean relative efficiency has 
increased by 45% to 0.77. The results are consistent with our expectation. We would 
expect relative efficiency to increase due to market forces including competition and 
Table 2  Sample selection
*, **, ***Significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Figures in parenthesis indicate t value
See Table 1 for variable definitions
Panel A: firm efficiency and cost of capital sample from 2000 to 2015
Potential Sample with sufficient data to compute efficiency scores 921 14,745
Excluding firms with insufficient financial data available (221) (3913)
Final Sample 677 10,832
Panel B: Sample selection by year using a panel
Year Obs Mean WACC Mean efficiency Year Obs Mean WACC Mean efficiency
2000 677 8.77 0.53 2008 677 6.91 0.69
2001 677 8.51 0.56 2009 677 6.51 0.60
2002 677 8.16 0.49 2010 677 6.41 0.77
2003 677 6.82 0.63 2011 677 6.65 0.73
2004 677 6.17 0.57 2012 677 6.26 0.73
2005 677 6.62 0.46 2013 677 5.38 0.75
2006 677 6.87 0.54 2014 677 5.01 0.77
2007 677 6.71 0.67 2015 677 5.12 0.77
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globalization. A decrease in WACC suggests that Korean firms have become relatively 
less risky since 2000.
4  Empirical results
4.1  Univariate analysis
In Table  3, we provide descriptive statistics and Person Correlations. The means and 
medians are consistent for all variables, demonstrating a normal sample. The mean 
value for relative efficiency is 0.64, a positive number. The mean value of absolute effi-
ciency is 0.00. Our results of interest for the Person Correlations are bold in column 
1. We find there is a negative relation between WACC, relative efficiency (− 0.12) and 
absolute efficiency and WACC (− 0.05), both statistically significant at the 0.01% level. 
Without controlling for firm risk values, the results suggest that more efficient firms are 
expected to pay lower borrowing costs.
The remainder of our Pearson Correlations show the correct signs and are all statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level. Consistent with our expectation, there is a positive rela-
tion between relative market risk (0.51), leverage (0.08), earnings management (0.15) 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations
Obs Mean (Med) S. D 1 2 3 4 5
1. WACC 10,832 6.80 (6.54) 2.71 1
2. Rela-
tive_Effi
10,832 0.64 (0.79) 0.34 − 0.12*** 1
3. Absolute_
Effi
10,832 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 − 0.05*** 0.24*** 1
4. Market_
Risk
10,832 0.86 (0.77) 5.84 0.51*** − 0.01* 0.01 1
5. Size 10,832 18.71 (18.48) 1.47 − 0.11*** − 0.00 0.17*** − 0.01 1
6. Lev 10,832 0.44 (0.43) 0.36 0.08*** − 0.03*** − 0.13*** 0.02* 0.05***
7. CFO 10,832 0.04 (0.04) 0.12 − 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.54*** − 0.01 0.11***
8. EM 10,832 0.07 (0.05) 0.08 0.15*** 0.01 − 0.09*** 0.02** − 0.20***
9. Bigown 10,832 0.36 (0.37) 0.22 − 0.03*** − 0.02** 0.08*** − 0.03*** 0.07***
10. CR 10,832 5.14 (5) 1.9 − 0.11*** − 0.10*** − 0.43*** 0.02*** − 0.01
11. Audit_
Hour
10,832 6.41 (6.51) 1.25 − 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06***
7 8 9 10 11
7. CFO 10,832 0.04 (0.04) 0.12 1
8. EM 10,832 0.07 (0.05) 0.08 − 0.07*** 1
9. Bigown 10,832 0.36 (0.37) 0.22 0.02*** − 0.11*** 1
10. CR 10,832 5.14 (5) 1.9 − 0.36*** 0.18*** − 0.11*** 1
11. Audit_Hour 10,832 6.41 (6.51) 1.25 0.03*** − 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.02** 1
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and WACC. Likewise, we find a negative relation between size (− 0.11), CFO (− 0.06), 
large ownership (− 0.03), credit risk (− 0.11), audit hour (− 0.18) and WACC.
4.2  Multivariate analysis
In Table 4, we provide results of OLS regression to test the relationship between relative 
efficiency and weighted average cost of capital. In row 2, Table 4 we find a negative rela-
tion between WACC and relative efficiency (coeff − 0.33, t − 8.35). The result suggests that 
RFE, a measure that captures the utilization of resources and costs under the direct control 
of management is considered by capital providers and investors as a form of operational 
Table 4  Influence of Firm 
Efficiency on Cost of Capital 
(WACC)
*, **, ***Significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Figures in 
parenthesis indicate t value
See Table 1 for variable definitions
Model: 
WACCi,t = 0 + 1Relative_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t
+ 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t + 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t






Relative_Effi – − 0.33***
(− 8.35)
Market_Risk  + 2.54***
(74.92)
Size – − 0.04***
(− 3.71)
Lev  + 0.52***
(5.78)
CFO – − 0.81***
(− 6.86)
EM  + 2.03***
(11.40)
Bigown – − 0.83***
(− 9.96)
CR – − 0.06***
(− 5.70)







Annals of Operations Research 
1 3
performance that reduces capital costs. We interpret that the management of firms that do 
not possess the capability of maximizing sales from ‘given resources’ and ‘costs’ must 
therefore pay a premium based on their relative inefficiency. On the other hand, efficient 
firms are rewarded by capital providers with lower borrowing costs, allowing us to accept 
our first hypothesis. All our control variables are statistically significant and demonstrate 
the expected signs. Market risk (coeff 2.54, t value 74.92), leverage (coeff 0.52, t value 
5.78) and earnings management (coeff 2.03, t value 11.40) are shown to increase WACC. 
Large (coeff − 0.04, t value 3.71), cash rich firms (coeff − 0.81, t value − 6.86) with large 
ownership (coeff − 0.83, t value − 9.96), higher credit ratings (coeff − 0.06, t value − 5.70) 
and increased audit effort in hours (coeff − 0.29, t value − 22.85) are also expected to pay 
lower WACC.
Next, we perform an empirical test to determine whether relative efficiency has a dif-
ferent effect on WACC compared to absolute efficiency. In Table 5, model 1, we list the 
results from Table 4 to enable a comparison. In model 2, we use OLS regression to estab-
lish whether there is a relation between AFE and WACC. Our results demonstrate that 
there is an insignificant relationship between AFE and WACC. In model 3, we demon-
strate relative efficiency has incrementally more explanatory power compared to absolute 
measures to explain a firm’s WACC. We find that after controlling for absolute efficiency, 
relative efficiency still has a statistically significant negative relation with WACC (coeff − 
0.27, t value − 5.29). The results allow us to accept our second hypothesis. We contribute 
to the literature by demonstrating for the first time, relative efficiency measuring opera-
tional performance, and absolute efficiency measured using a simple accounting ratios are 
not equivalent measures of firm risk, thus interpreted differently by capital providers.
5  Additional analysis
5.1  Cost of debt versus cost of equity
In our additional analysis, we aggregate a firm’s borrowing costs into the two separate 
components of WACC. We provide details of two separate regressions to estimate the 
relation between 1, COD with relative efficiency: and 2, COE with relative efficiency. We 
estimate the values for COD in Eq. (2) and COE in Eq. (3) using the CAPM model. The 
efficiency-risk hypothesis underpins the development of the main hypotheses for this study, 
as it provides the link from efficiency to the cost of capital. Under the hypothesis, more 
efficient firms select lower equity ratios than other firms because higher efficiency reduces 
the expected costs of financial distress (Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010). Hence more efficient 
firms may face a lower cost of capital, recognising all else equal. To add further robustness 
to our analysis, we test whether the cost of debt has a more pronounced association with 
efficiency compared to cost of equity. In Table 6, we provide the results of our regressions. 
In column 2, we find a negative relation between relative efficiency and cost of debt (coeff 
− 0.55, t value − 3.84). In column 3 we find a negative relation between relative efficiency 
and cost of equity (coeff − 0.41, t value − 21.32). Taken together, the results show that the 
debt coefficient is more negative (economic significance is larger and both are statistically 
significance at 1%) compared to cost of equity, implying that as efficiency increases, cost 
of debt is likely to decrease at a higher rate compared to cost of equity. However, taken 
together, the results suggest that banks and other financial intermediaries that provide firms 
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with debt expect higher capital cost premiums from firms with lower RFE compared to 
relatively more efficient peers, consistent with the our main findings.
Table 5  Relative efficiency versus absolute efficiency
*, **, ***Significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Figures in parenthesis indicate t value
See Table 1 for variable definitions
Model 1: WACCi,t = 0 + 1Relative_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t
+ 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t + 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t
+ 8Credit_Riski,t + 9Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t
 
Model 2: WACCi,t = 0 + 1Absolute_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t
+ 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t + 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t
+ 8CreditRiski,t + 9AuditQualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t
Mode3: WACCi,t = 0 + 1Relative_Effii,t + 2Absolute_Effii,t + 3Market_Riski,t
+ 4Sizei,t + 5Levi,t + 6CFOi,t + 7EMi,t + 8Bigowni,t
+ 9Credit_Riski,t + 10Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t































































ID Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included
f value 858.25*** 623.75*** 565.43***
Adj. R2 0.4162 0.4489 0.4510
Obs 10,832 10,691 10,691
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5.2  Risk criteria
Next, we divide our sample based on risk criteria. In our main analysis, the results sug-
gest that operational performance can be interpreted as a form of risk that increases 
WACC. Therefore, we divide our groups into 3 ’risk criteria’ and repeat to see whether 
it is possible capture consistent results. Our first criterion is a firm’s age; we expect 
older firms to pay lower WACC based on reputation and market presence. The second 
Table 6  Cost of debt versus cost of equity
*, **, ***Significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Figures in parenthesis indicate t value
See Table 1 for variable definitions
Model 1: WACCi,t = 0 + 1Relative_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t
+ 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t + 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t
+ 8Credit_Riski,t + 9Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t
 
Model 2: Cost of Debt = 0 + 1Relative_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t
+ 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t + 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t
+ 8Credit_Riski,t + 9Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t
Model 3: Cost of Equityi,t = 0 + 1Relative_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t
+ 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t + 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t
+ 8Credit_Riski,t + 9Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t





























































ID Included Included Included
YD Included Included Included
f value 858.25*** 100.04*** 5431.90***
Adj. R2 0.4162 0.0777 0.8207
Obs 10,832 10,691 10,691
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risk criterion is firm size; larger firms have more resources compared to smaller firms 
that are less able to deal with market shocks. The third risk criterion, credit rating is 
based on the assumption that credit ratings provide a meaningful representation of 
credit risk (Faure‐Grimaud et al., 2009; Mathis et al., 2009; Skreta & Veldkamp, 2009).
We conduct both univariate mean/median difference tests and multivariate OLS regres-
sion analysis to compare different groups. We partition our entire sample into (1) old and 
young firms, (2) Big and small firms, (3) investment and non-investment grade firms. We 
define old/young as firms with a ‘firm age’ that is above/below the median. Big/small firms 
are firms that are listed in KOSPI (large) /KOSDAQ (small) stock exchanges. Investment/
non-investment grade firms are the firms with credit rating scores of 5 or/and above/below. 
In Table 7 Panel A, we illustrate the results of our univariate analysis, the first two col-
umns compare the mean/median of WACC and relative efficiency for two different groups 
divided by ‘risk criteria’; (1) old and young, (2) KOSPI and KOSDAQ, (3) IG and NIG. 
The third column titled ’Diff test’ shows the difference test results between WACC and 
relative efficiency based on ’risk criteria’.
Based on firm age, we find that older firms have lower WACC (t − 1.86, z value − 2.88) 
and relative efficiency (t − 2.67, z value − 5.08) compared to smaller firms. This would 
suggest that larger firms have more complex business operations; however, are able to 
retain cheaper capital. Moreover, the results suggest that market participants reward older 
firms with lower capital costs consistent with business survival theory, (long-term sus-
tainability of organization) that implies older firms can run more complex organizations. 
Similarly, we find that larger KOSPI firms have lower WACC (t − 7.17, z value − 15.54) 
and lower relative efficiency (t − 13.14, z value − 8.67) compared to smaller KOSDAQ 
firms, suggesting that KOSPI listed firms are perceived as less risky, but KOSDAQ firms 
are relatively more efficient. Finally, we find that IG firms have lower WACC (t − 10.90, z 
value − 8.57) and higher relative efficiency (t 7.63, z value 13.16) compared to investment 
grade firms, suggesting that credit rating agencies consider relative efficiency when issuing 
investment/non-investment grade credit ratings, consistent with Mali and Lim (2019).
In Table 7 Panel B, we use multivariate analysis using 6 different samples based on ’risk 
criteria’. Overall, there is a negative relation between relative efficiency and WACC con-
sistent with our mean/median different tests and main analyses. After partitioning our sam-
ple into two different groups, we find that the negative relationship between relative effi-
ciency and WACC is stronger for: (1) older firms (Coeffi − 0.45, t value − 7.74) compared 
younger firms (Coeffi − 0.18, t value − 3.34): (2) KOSPI (bigger) firms (Coeffi − 0.41, t 
value − 7.40) compared to KOSDAQ (smaller) firms (Coeffi − 0.17, t value − 3.05): 3) 
and NIG firms (Coeffi − 0.27, t value − 7.50) compared to IG firms (Coeffi − 0.48, t value 
− 5.97). However, regardless of our risk status partitioning, we find consistent evidence 
that RFE is a statistically significant predictor in reducing WACC.
5.3  Persistency tests
Next, we perform persistency tests. We perform various regressions estimating the rela-
tion between relative efficiency and WACC in various periods in period t + 1 (and t + 2). In 
Table 8, relative efficiency has a persistent effect on a firm’s WACC in subsequent periods 
(t + 1 and t + 2). We interpret that relative efficiency not only predicts the current WACC 
value, it also predicts WACC in subsequent periods, suggesting that RFE has an incremen-
tal effect on WACC in subsequent calendar years.
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Table 7  Risk criteria
Model:
WACCi,t = 0 + 1Relative_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t
+ 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t + 8Credit_Riski,t + 9Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t
Panel A: Univariate Analysis













































Panel B: multivariate 
analysis













Controls Included Included Included
ID & YD Included Included Included
f value 858.25*** 319.34*** 581.80***
Adj. R2 0.4162 0.3432 0.4968
Obs 10,823 5510 5313













Controls Included Included Included
ID &YD Included Included Included
f value 858.25*** 283.44*** 581.88***
Adj. R2 0.4162 0.3228 0.4891
Obs 10,823 5362 5461
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5.4  Consideration of other control variables
In our main analysis, we use a linear regression model where our independent variable 
to proxy for market risk is market beta (relative market risk). Although market beta is a 
robust proxy for risk, we repeat our analysis after replacing market beta with stock price 
volatility (absolute market risk) based on Lim and Mali (2018a, 2018b) who show that 
both beta and stock price volatility capture market risk in efficiency models. Untabulated 
results are consistent with our main analysis using both risk proxies, suggesting our model 
is robust to both forms of market risk. Secondly, we estimate relative efficiency using SFA 
instead of DEA. Some studies exclusively use SFA (Callen et al., 2005) to measure effi-
ciency. However, SFA and DEA frontier analyses are commonly and interchangeably used 
in business academic research (Baik et al., 2013; Dopuchet al., 2003), and both have a high 
correlation coefficient (Kendall’s Tau). DEA is a non-parametric approach that establishes 
an efficiency frontier using mathematical programming. SFA is a parametric approach that 
hypothesizes an efficiency frontier and estimates parameters econometrically using the 
*, **, ***Significance level at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Figures in parenthesis indicate t value
See Table 1 for variable definitions
Table 7  (continued)













Controls Included Included Included
ID & YD Included Included Included
f value 858.25*** 1218.76*** 198.87***
Adj. R2 0.4162 0.6336 0.2864
Obs 10,832 6354 4469
Table 8  Persistency tests
Model:
WACCi,t+1,t+2…,t+8 = 0 + 1Relative_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t
+ 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t + 8Credit_Riski,t + 9Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t










ID &YD Included Included
f value 298.36*** 188.32***
Adj. R2 0.1996 0.1466
Obs 10,779 9878
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entire set of DMUs. When we repeat our analysis by replacing DEA with SFA, as expected, 
our results are consistent with our main hypothesis.
5.5  Firm fixed effect and Fama–Macbeth two‑step procedure
Due to market forces, relative efficiency may not be consistent over time due to the accu-
mulation of corporate knowledge and technological developments. For robustness we 
cross-sectionally estimate relative efficiency for each year in the dataset and examine the 
relationship between WACC and relative efficiency for each year using the technique sug-
gested by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Thus, to control for year/firm effects, we include 
dummy variables for each firm and year, and repeat our regressions. We report untabulated 
results that results are consistent with previous findings.
5.6  Endogeneity tests
Next, we test for endogeneity using the two stage least square model listed in Eq. (9). In 
stage one of the model, relative efficiency (endogenous variable) is set as a dependent vari-
able with all key determinants included as control variables (period t). The two instruments 
(independent variables) that are likely to have an influence on relative efficiency are (i) 
relative efficiency in the previous year (t − 1), because the values are inherently associ-
ated, and (ii) 2) absolute efficiency (ATO = Sales/Assets) at time t. We also control for vari-
ables that are likely to influence relative efficiency including market risk, size, leverage, 
CFO, EM, Bigown, credit risk, and audit quality. Our results suggest that relative efficiency 
is persistent, largely influenced by relative efficiency in the previous year (Coeff 0.65, t 
value 92.19), and positively associated with absolute firm efficiency (Assets Turn Over 
ratio) (Coeff 0.02, t value 4.52). Moreover, relatively efficient firms are likely to be rela-
tively smaller (Coeff − 0.01, t value − 4.25) and have higher leverage (Lev) (Coeff 0.06, t 
value 3.40). Furthermore, they have relatively higher cash performance (CFO) (Coeff 0.09, 
t value 4.34), have higher ownership concentration (Bigown) (Coeff 0.04, t value 2.74) and 
higher audit quality (Coeff 0.02, t value 8.34).
After deriving a value of relative efficiency in Eq. (9), we compute Eq. (10) where the 
computed predicted value of relative efficiency from Eq. (9) is used as a control variable, 
with other control variable being held constant. Untabulated results demonstrate that our 
results are qualitatively indifferent (Predicted Relative_effi Coeff − 0.39, t value − 6.53). 
Next, we conduct the Durbin and Wu-Hausman test. The null hypothesis implies that the 
variable (relative efficiency) is exogenous. The Wooldridge’s score is insignificant, imply-
ing that the model (the positive relationship between the two main dimensions) is free from 
endogeneity (score = 1.58, p = 0.21).
(9)
1st stage ∶ Relative_Effii,t = 1Relative_Effii,t−1 + 2Absolute_Effii,t
+ 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t + 6Bigowni,t
+ 7Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t
(10)
2nd stage ∶ WACCi,t = 1 Prediced_Relative_Effii,t + 2Market_Riski,t
+ 3Sizei,t + 4Levi,t + 5CFOi,t + 6EMi,t + 7Bigowni,t
+ 8Credit_Riski,t + 9Audit_Qualityi,t + ID + YD + i,t
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5.7  Isotonic regression
To justify the selection of variables in our DEA model, we conduct an isotonic regression 
analysis. For brevity, we only discuss untabulated results. As expected, cost of goods sold 
and SG&A are strongly positively associated with output (sales), since these are the direct 
costs to achieve a certain level of sales. Furthermore, tangible resources (net property, 
plant, and equipment) also show a positive relationship with sales, since larger firms with 
high level of fixed assets tend to produce a high level of sales. However, intangible assets 
(operating lease, good will and other intangibles) have a weak relationship with sales, sug-
gesting that intangible assets alone do not directly increase sales.
6  Conclusions
In this study, we question the argument whether capital providers perceive relative firm 
efficiency (RFE) differently compared to absolute firm efficiency (AFE). Our results show 
that capital providers demand a higher capital cost premium based on lower levels of RFE. 
However, interestingly we do not find a consistent relationship when we replace RFE with 
AFE. We find that ROA (AFE) is not likely to have any influence on a firm’s WACC, sug-
gesting that capital providers do not impound AFE into WACC. Our study is important 
for several reasons. First, previous studies suggest that credit rating agencies reward firms 
with higher operational performance (RFE) with higher credit ratings (Lim & Mali, 2019). 
There is also evidence that RFE has a direct influence on market participants’ propensity 
to invest and disinvest. Our results show that debt and equity providers are also effective 
monitors of operational performance and reward firms with higher RFE with lower WACC. 
This result is important to the extant literature because linking managerial performance 
and firm organizational benefit is referred to as a ‘blackbox’ in the management literature 
(Combs et al., 2006; Venkatraman, & Ramanujam, 1986). We clearly link managerial deci-
sion making and related benefits. The results are important for industry because lowering 
capital costs is the primary function of a firm’s finance department. We interpret that capi-
tal providers consider RFE as a form of firm risk and demand higher WACC based on firm 
risk status, extending previous studies that suggest that operational performance and firm 
risk are linked (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2016; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; 
Seshadri & Subrahmanyam, 2005).
Second, to our knowledge, we are the very first to show that AFE and RFE are not per-
ceived as equivalent risk measures by market participants. Numerous studies suggest that 
RFE is a more robust measure of firm performance compared to AFE (Demerjian et al., 
2012a, b; Leverty & Grace, 2012; Barr & Siems, 1997; Mali & Lim, 2019; Lim & Mali, 
2021). Baik et al. (2013) demonstrate that both RFE and AFE are potentially both informa-
tive based on evidence both variables can be included in a single regression analysis with-
out the existence of collinearity problems. We expand the literature by showing that capital 
providers consider operational efficiency (RFE) when issuing capital costs, but not (AFE). 
As suggested in our second hypothesis, we surmise that capital providers consider RFE to 
be a firm risk indicator but not AFE: because, (1) AFE (ROA) has a mathematical limita-
tion because writing off assets/equity improves AFE ratios, leading to bias; (2) RFE uses 
values that are under the direct control of management to generate sales whilst AFE uses 
all asset values whether they have been utilized to generate sales or not; (3) RFE calcu-
lates the most effective utilization of a $1 input to generate sales from a combination of 
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resources, AFE considered all inputs equal; (4) RFE considers the efficiency margins as 
relative amongst firms with the same industry and the market as a whole, but AFE con-
siders all industries equal, and (5) RFE can be considered as enhancing transparency and 
reducing information asymmetry because it is an informative measure of managerial deci-
sion making.
Third, there are conflicting views in the literature regarding the relevance of account-
ing information to measure firm performance. Rangone (1997) suggest that linking organi-
zational strategic effectiveness and accounting numbers is important. However, Chamber 
(1960) posits the accounting process has been formalized to a point to where accounting 
values misinterpret a firm’s financial position. This argument is consistent with Athanasso-
poulos and Thanassoulis (1995) who consider financial ratios to be misleading, and many 
others who advocate that the literature move beyond an accounting approach. Based on 
our results, we surmise that analysts and market participants may interpret both types of 
efficiency differently. We find RFE, but not AFE can be considered a measure of risk by 
capital providers. However, countless studies utilize ROA/ROE (amongst other AFE meas-
ures) to capture the influence of efficiency on upside performance but exclude RFE. As a 
result, we show that analysts should consider AFE and RFE as different forms of efficiency 
in specific situations especially in relation to risk. Firm risk analyses should therefore 
include operational performance (RFE) in regressions as a firm risk control. Furthermore, 
we would encourage empirical studies to differentiate and include both types of efficiency 
to improve the predictive validity of regression models. Future studies can enhance the 
literature by demonstrating instances in which RFE differs from AFE based on the percep-
tions of market participants.
Finally, we list avenues for future research and limitations. Using a South Korean data-
set, our results demonstrate that relatively more efficient firms should have lower WACC. 
South Korea is a developed country based on economic power, but a developing country 
based on legal infrastructure (Wood, 2013; WTO, 2021). Following major financial col-
lapses, South Korea strives to protect market participants by implementing value adding 
financial policies (Choi et  al., 2017). Therefore, we utilize a unique dataset to provide 
valuable insights to the academic community, market participants and legislators in both 
developing and developed countries. However, whether our results are consistent using 
an international firm sample is a question left unanswered. We would therefore encourage 
future studies to use international datasets to test whether our results are generalizable in 
an international context. Due to data unavailability (interest spread), we do not use implied 
cost of capital or equivalent WACC measures that are used as substitutes for WACC in pre-
vious literature (Gebhardt et al., 2001; Hou et al, 2012). Instead we use the WACC measure 
listed in Eq. (1), a value acknowledged in previous Korean studies as the most commonly 
accepted measurement of WACC. We encourage future studies to capture whether the rela-
tionship between WACC and RFE is consistent based on alternative WACC measures.
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